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Reward prediction errorsAdolescence is associatedwith quickly changing environmental demands which require excellent adaptive skills
and high cognitive ﬂexibility. Feedback-guided adaptive learning and cognitive ﬂexibility are driven by reward
prediction error (RPE) signals, which indicate the accuracy of expectations and can be estimated using computa-
tional models. Despite the importance of cognitive ﬂexibility during adolescence, only little is known about how
RPE processing in cognitive ﬂexibility deviates between adolescence and adulthood.
In this study, we investigated the developmental aspects of cognitive ﬂexibility by means of computational
models and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We compared the neural and behavioral correlates
of cognitive ﬂexibility in healthy adolescents (12–16 years) to adults performing a probabilistic reversal learning
task. Using a modiﬁed risk-sensitive reinforcement learning model, we found that adolescents learned faster
from negative RPEs than adults. The fMRI analysis revealed that within the RPE network, the adolescents had a
signiﬁcantly altered RPE-response in the anterior insula. This effect seemed to be mainly driven by increased re-
sponses to negative prediction errors.
In summary, our ﬁndings indicate that decision making in adolescence goes beyond merely increased reward-
seeking behavior and provides a developmental perspective to the behavioral and neural mechanisms underly-
ing cognitive ﬂexibility in the context of reinforcement learning.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Adolescence is a timewhenmany things in life change at a very high
pace. Its start is marked by the onset of puberty, when fundamental
physiological alterations take place (Blakemore et al., 2010). At the
same time, peer relationships change markedly (Brown, 2004;
Somerville, 2013) and it becomes often more important to please
peers than to obey the parents.With the transition into higher education
and professional career, also the demands in these domains change fun-
damentally. All of these changes demand to ﬂexibly adjust to the new
requirements, to disengage from previous and to engage in novel tar-
gets. Failure to adjust may cause social exclusion, dropout from schoolild and Adolescent Psychiatry
ürich, Switzerland.
. This is an open access article underor even psychiatric disorders and it is therefore very important for ado-
lescents to possess high cognitive ﬂexibility (Crone and Dahl, 2012).
The reinforcement learning (RL) theory (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
suggests that cognitive ﬂexibility and adaptive learning are driven by
reward prediction error (RPE) signals. These RPE signals indicate expec-
tation violations. It is well established that RPE-like signals are encoded
by dopaminergicmidbrain neurons (Schultz, 2002; Schultz et al., 1997).
For eventswhich are better than expected, a positive RPEwill be elicited
which reﬂects a phasic increase in dopaminergic ﬁring. For negative
RPEs – encoding events that areworse than expected – a decrease in do-
paminergic activity is found. Such RPE signals are projected to a decision
making network including striatal, prefrontal, and insular regions
(e.g., Blakemore and Robbins, 2012; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010;
Gläscher et al., 2009). Importantly, the RL theory provides amechanistic
view on the processes involved in cognitive ﬂexibility and therefore
enables us, at least partly, to overcome the merely descriptive level of
behavioral analysis.the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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hasmainly been operationalized by sudden and implicit shifts in reward
contingencies that have to be detected based on external feedback
(Scott, 1962). To test cognitive ﬂexibility, probabilistic reversal learning
tasks have often been used (e.g., Adleman et al., 2011; Britton et al.,
2010; Clarke et al., 2004; Klanker et al., 2013; van der Plasse and
Feenstra, 2008; Xue et al., 2013). In these tasks, the reward probabilities
of the objects change unpredictably and the subjects have to learn these
changes based on the feedback they receive. Computationally, these
feedback-driven learning processes can well be described by using a
RPE-learning model because the subjects learn entirely based on the
feedback (e.g., Gläscher et al., 2009; Hauser et al., 2014a). The neural
correlates of RPEs in probabilistic reversal learning tasks have been suc-
cessfully examined in previous studies on healthy adults and found to
positively correlate with mainly striatal and ventromedial prefrontal
areas, and to negatively correlate with areas such as the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex and the anterior insula (Gläscher et al., 2009;
Hampton et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2014a, b).
So far, only little is known about the developmental trajectories of
RPE processing. Despite the importance of RPE processing in adoles-
cence, only few studies have investigated RPE processing in adolescents
(Christakou et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2010; Javadi et al., 2014a; van den
Bos et al., 2012).While Cohen et al. (2010) found differential activations
between adolescents and adults in striatal areas, van den Bos et al.
(2012) were not able to replicate that ﬁnding, but found differences in
the connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the
ventral striatum. These studies, however, used learning tasks which
did not include reversals and therefore investigated merely associative
learning, but not cognitive ﬂexibility.
In this study, we were interested to study RPE processing in the
context of cognitive ﬂexibility and therefore compared performance
of healthy adolescents (12–16 years) to adults using a probabilistic re-
versal learning task. By using a modiﬁed RL model, we compared the
learningmechanisms during adaptive learning. Furthermore, we inves-
tigated RPE processing differences using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). Because previous studies found neural changes in activ-
ity in striatal andmedial prefrontal areas (Christakou et al., 2011; Cohen
et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2012), we hypothesized that these areas
might also show altered RPE signals in the context of cognitive ﬂexibil-
ity. Additionally, we hypothesized the anterior insular activity to be
altered, because this region is crucially involved in RPE processing
(Pessiglione et al., 2006; Seymour et al., 2004; Voon et al., 2010;
Wittmann et al., 2008), it is highly relevant for error processing
(Dosenbach et al., 2006) and it is known to show speciﬁc activation pat-
terns during adolescence (Smith et al., 2014).Fig. 1. Probabilistic reversal learning task. On each trial (average duration: 9000 ms), two
stimuli were simultaneously presented. The participant had to select one of the stimuli
within 1500 ms. The selected stimulus was highlighted until the end of the stimulus pre-
sentation (2500ms). After a jittered interstimulus interval (2000–4000ms), the outcome
was displayed for 1000 ms. Rewards were indicated by a framed coin whereas punish-
ments were depicted by a crossed coin. Between trials, a jittered ﬁxation cross was
shown (2000–4000 ms).Materials and methods
Participants
Thirty-seven subjects participated in this study. One participant
(13.0 y, m) had to be excluded prior to analysis due to excessive move-
ment (N2.5 mm scan-to-scan motion). The adolescent group consisted
of 19 participants between 12 and 16 years (14.7 y ± 1.3, 10 females).
The adult group consisted of 17 participants between 20 and 29 years
(25.6 y ± 2.4, 10 females). All participants were right-handed and
none reported any neurologic or psychiatric disorder. During scanning,
there was no difference in movement between both groups (scan-to-
scan movement: adults: mean = .079 mm ± .021; adolescents:
mean= .076mm± .016; t(34)= .496, p= .623). Data from 15 adults
(Hauser et al., 2014a) and all adolescents (Hauser et al., 2014b)were al-
ready used in previous articles. The study was approved by the local
ethics committee and all adult participants gave written informed con-
sent. For the adolescent group, the participants and their parents signed
the consent form.Task
The participants performed a probabilistic reversal learning task
(Fig. 1; cf. Hauser et al., 2014a)while functionalmagnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI) was recorded. The participants had to learn on a trial-and-
error basis which of two presented stimuli was associated with the
higher reward probability. One of the two stimuli was determined to
be the correct stimulus and was rewarded with probability of 80%. The
other stimulus was assigned with a reward probability of 20% and was
punished in 80% of the trials. After the subject made at least 6 correct
choices (maximum of 10 correct choices, randomly determined), a re-
versal of the reward probabilities occurred. Of the correct choices, at
least 3 choices had to be consecutively correct to ensure that the sub-
jects learned the association properly. When a reversal occurred, the
previously correct stimulus became the incorrect stimulus, and vice
versa. The possibility of reversals occurring was communicated to the
participants beforehand, but they were not provided with any details
about the frequency of the reversals. As a reward, the participants re-
ceived 50 Swiss Centimes (approx. $0.50),whereas punishments result-
ed in a loss of 50 Swiss Centimes. The participants performed two runs
of 60 trials each. Additionally, 20 null trials (9000 ms length) were ran-
domly presented in each run. To force the participants tominimizemis-
ses, late answers were punished by subtracting 100 Swiss Centimes.Reinforcement learning models
We compared three different reinforcement learning models. Be-
sides a standard Rescorla–Wagner model (Rescorla and Wagner,
1972), we implemented a model which had different learning rates for
positive and negative RPEs. A similarmodel has already been used in ad-
olescent decision making (van den Bos et al., 2012) and was implied to
bemore risk-sensitive (cf. Niv et al., 2012). Given thatwe have previous-
ly shown that reinforcement learningmodels with anticorrelated valua-
tion ﬁtted this task better than a standard Rescorla–Wagner model
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anticorrelated valuation (RSAV) extension as a third model.
Rescorla–Wagner model
RPEs were computed as the difference between the expected
(VtChosen) and the received (Rt) outcome at each trial t.
RPEt ¼ Rt−VChosent ð1Þ
The value of the chosen object was updated using the RPE, whereas
the value of the unchosen object (Vt + 1Unchosen) did not change its value.
VChosentþ1 ¼ VChosent þ αRPEt ð2Þ
VUnchosentþ1 ¼ VUnchosent ð3Þ
where α is the learning rate.
Risk-sensitive model
In a seminal paper by Niv et al. (2012), the authors showed that
tasks, where risk or outcome variance is not explicitly available, individ-
ual risk sensitivity can be assessed by using different learning rates for
positive and negative RPEs. The chosen value Vt+1Chosen was therefore up-
dated depending on the sign of the RPE
VChosentþ1 ¼ VChosent þ αþ=−RPEt ð4Þ
whereas the value of the unchosen object was not changed Eq. (3). For
positive RPEs, chosen valueswere updated using the free parameter α+,
whereas for negative RPE, α−was deﬁned as the learning rate.
Risk-sensitive model with anticorrelated valuation (RSAV)
In reversal learning tasks, the feedback about the chosen object also
informs about the value of the unchosen stimulus. Therefore, we and
others used RPEs also to update the unchosen option (Gläscher et al.,
2009; Hauser et al., 2014a). Here, we implemented the anticorrelation
in the risk-sensitive model:
VChosentþ1 ¼ VChosent þ αþ=−ChosenRPEt ð5Þ
VUnchosentþ1 ¼ VUnchosent −αþ=−UnchosenRPEt ð6Þ
where αChosen/Unchosen+/− describes the free parameter, which is different
for chosen and unchosen options and for positive and negative RPEs.
To derive the action probabilities, we used a softmax action selection
function in all models:
p Atð Þ ¼
1
1þ e− VAt−VBtð Þτ
ð7Þ
p Btð Þ ¼ 1−p Atð Þ ð8Þ
where VtA denotes the value of object A at time t and τ denotes a free
parameter.
Model estimation and comparison
For each participant, we estimated the maximum log-likelihood
(cf. Hampton et al., 2006) using a genetic search algorithm (Goldberg,
1989) in Matlab, similar as in our previous study (Hauser et al., 2014a):
logL ¼
X
Bswitch logPswitch
Nswitch
þ
X
Bstay logPstay
Nstay
ð9ÞThe behavioral component B indicates whether the participant
switched on the subsequent trial and P indicates the estimatedprobabil-
ity to switch or stay.
Akaike information criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) was used to com-
pare the models (cf. Hampton et al., 2006):
AIC ¼−2 logLþ 2M
N
ð10Þ
whereM describes the number of free parameters and N is the number
of trials. To choose the best-ﬁtting among all models, we used Bayesian
model selection for groups (Stephan et al., 2009).
In order to investigate whether the groups differed in their learning
mechanisms, we ﬁtted the free parameters of the best ﬁtting model
(RSAV model) to the behavior of each participant. These individual
parameter estimates were subsequently compared between the age-
groups.
For the fMRI analysis,we estimated one single set of canonicalmodel
parameters (αc+, αc−, αu+, αu−, τ) for all participants, similarly as in previ-
ous studies (e.g., Pine et al., 2010; Seymour et al., 2012; Voon et al.,
2010). We decided to do so, because we were not interested to model
any behavioral differences into our fMRI regression analysis and in
order to obtain canonical and stable parameter estimates.
Data acquisition
fMRI was conducted using a 3T Achieva (Philips Medical Systems,
Best, the Netherlands), equipped with a 32-element receive head coil
array. The echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence was designed to mini-
mize susceptibility-induced signal dropouts in orbitofrontal regions
(40 slices, 2.5 × 2.5 × 2.5 mm voxels, 0.7 mm gap, FA: 85° FOV: 240
× 240 × 127 mm, TR: 1850 ms, TE: 20 ms, 15° tilted downward of AC-
PC). Additionally, we simultaneously recorded 64-channel EEG and
two electrocardiogram (ECG) channels usingMR-compatible ampliﬁers
(BrainProducts GmbH, Gilching, Germany). ECG signals were used to
minimize cardioballistic artifacts in the fMRI data (see below). The pres-
ent article focusses on the presentation of the fMRI data.
fMRI data analysis
fMRI analysis was conducted using SPM8 (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm/). The EPIs were realigned and coregistered to the T1 image.
Normalization was performed using the deformation ﬁelds which
were generated using new segmentation. This resulted in a standard
voxel size of 1.5 mm. Finally, spatial smoothing (6 mm full width at
half maximum kernel) was conducted.
For the main effect analysis of RPEs in cognitive ﬂexibility, we en-
tered the model-derived RPEs as parametric modulator at the time of
feedback into the ﬁrst-level analysis. We additionally entered several
regressors-of-no-interest into the GLM to improve model validity:
choice values (value of chosen object) as parametric modulator at cue
presentation, realignment-derived movement parameters, scan-to-
scan movements greater than 1 mm, and cardiac pulsations (http://
www.translationalneuromodeling.org/tapas/; Glover et al., 2000;
Kasper et al., 2009). Furthermore, we regressed out missing answers
and the temporal and spatial derivatives of all task-related regressors.
To analyze themain effect of RPEs at the second level, we entered all
participants in a common random-effects analysis. The signiﬁcance
threshold was set to p b .05 voxel-height family-wise error (FWE) cor-
rection. For a better understanding of the RPE effects in each group,
we displayed the RPE effects for each group separately in the supple-
mentary material (Figs. S1, S2).
To obtain differential activations between our age groups, we re-
stricted our analysis to areas which were involved in RPE processing
(mask ofwhole-group effect at level p b .05 FWE, cf. Table 2) and carried
Fig. 2. Learning rate differences between adolescents and adults. The parameters from the
RSAVmodel show an increased learning rate for negative RPEs in chosen stimuli (αc−). The
other learning rates did not signiﬁcantly differ. *: p b .05, multiple comparison corrected.
350 T.U. Hauser et al. / NeuroImage 104 (2015) 347–354out independent-sample t-tests. For the group comparison at second
level, a signiﬁcance threshold of p b 0.05 cluster-extent FWE was used
(voxel height threshold p b .001). An unrestricted whole-brain group
comparison is shown in the supplementary Fig. S3.
To better understand how the group differences are caused, we
conducted a second, exploratory analysis of the functional differences
in the areas which were signiﬁcant in the group comparison using
rfxplot (Gläscher, 2009). To do so, we conducted a post-hoc analysis of
the signiﬁcantly different cluster (here: aIns) and split the RPEs into
three equally sized bins: negative, neutral (boundaries: adolescents:
[−0.30 ± 0.23, 0.18 ± 0.04], adults: [−0.25 ± 0.18, 0.19 ± 0.05])
and positive RPEs. The boundaries did not differ between the groups
(lower: t(34) = .64, p= .527; upper: t(34)= .70, p= .490). We com-
pared the neural responses in these bins using repeated measures
ANOVAs and post-hoc t-tests, corrected for multiple comparisons
using Bonferroni correction.
Results
Behavior
Both groups performed the task equally well with 73.83% (±4.4%)
correct responses in adults and 73.38% (±4.6%) in adolescents
(t(34) = .296, p= .769). The groups also did not differ in the number
of reversals which they performed. The adults switched on average
23.35 (±8.80) times and the adolescents reversed 26.11 (±8.31)
times (t(34) =− .965, p= .341). Interestingly, we found a marginally
decreased number of punishments before the adolescents switched
(t(34)= 1.71, p= .097, adolescents: 1.56± 0.22, adults: 1.71± 0.30).
Model comparison and parameters
The RSAV model clearly outperformed the other models across all
subjects, as well as in both groups separately (Table 1). To evaluate
whether model parameters were different between the groups, we
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with between-subject factor
group (adults, adolescents) and within-subject factor parameter
(αc+, αc−, αu+, αu−, τ). We found a signiﬁcant difference between the
free parameters (F(4,136) = 73.45, p b .001) as well as an interaction
between the parameters and the group (F(4,136) = 2.851, p = .026).
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that adolescents had a signiﬁcantly increased
learning rate for negative RPEs in chosen objects (αc−: adults: .49 ±
.05, adolescents: .69 ± .05, t(34) =−2.816, p= .04, multiple compar-
ison corrected, Fig. 2), whereas the other parameters did not differ
signiﬁcantly (αc+: adults: .45 ± .10, adolescents: .62 ± .07, t(34) =
−1.336, p = .95; αu+: adults: .72 ± .08, adolescents: .78 ± .07,
t(34) = − .581, p = 1.00; αu−: adults: .58 ± .06, adolescents: .63 ±
.04, t(34) = − .636, p = 1.00; τ: 2.4 ± .2, adolescents: 1.9 ± .2,
t(34) = 1.595, p= .60).
fMRI analysis
RPE in cognitive ﬂexibility
In our main effect analysis of RPEs in cognitive ﬂexibility, we found
areas which are typically positively correlated with RPEs (increasingTable 1
Results of the model comparison. Model comparison clearly revealed that the RSAV model has
(mean ± SD). logL: maximum log-Likelihood, AIC: Akaike Information Criterion, px: exceedan
Model All subjects Adolescents
logL AIC px logL
Rescorla–Wagner −0.98 ± 0.12 1.999 ± 0.248 0 −0.98 ± 0.1
Risk–sensitive −0.97 ± 0.13 1.985 ± 0.250 0 −0.97 ± 0.1
RSAV −0.66 ± 0.21 1.407 ± 0.411 1 −0.67 ± 0.2RPEs elicit more activity) such as the putamen, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC), amygdala and the posterior cingulate (Table 2). The bi-
lateral anterior insula (aIns), bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were signiﬁcantly
anticorrelated with RPEs (decreasing RPEs elicit more activity, Table 2,
Fig. 3A).
Group comparison
We analyzed whether the responses within the RPE network signif-
icantly differed between the groups. We found one signiﬁcant cluster in
the right aIns (peakMNI x=33, y=18, z=3; t= 4.60, k=33, Fig. 3B)
which showed increased activation for decreasing RPEs in adolescents.
We did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcantly increased activation for positive RPEs
in adolescents.
To better understand how the aIns differed in activation between ad-
olescents, we decided to conduct an exploratory analysis of this cluster.
We divided the RPEs in three equally sized bins of positive, neutral and
negative RPEs. The repeated measures ANOVA with factors group (ado-
lescents, adults) and RPE (negative, neutral, positive) revealed a signiﬁ-
cant RPE-effect (indicating that the aIns is modulated by RPEs across all
subjects, F(2,34) = 40.37, p b .001), a signiﬁcant group-by-RPE interac-
tion (indicating that only some RPE bins differ between groups,
F(2,34) = 4.60, p = .013), but no signiﬁcant group effect (indicating
that the group difference was not caused by generally increased or de-
creased responses across all RPE bins, F(1,34) = 1.77, p = .193). Post-
hoc t-tests of the three bins revealed that the interaction was caused
by a signiﬁcantly increased response to negative RPEs in adolescents
compared to adults (t(34) = −4.08, p b .001, corrected for multiplea better model ﬁt than the Rescorla–Wagner and the risk-sensitive model in both groups
ce probability (probability that the given model ﬁts data better than the other models).
Adults
AIC px logL AIC px
4 1.997 ± 0.271 0 −0.98 ± 0.11 2.001 ± 0.229 0
4 1.988 ± 0.282 0 −0.97 ± 0.11 1.981 ± 0.219 0
3 1.424 ± 0.464 1 −0.65 ± 0.18 1.387 ± 0.356 1
Table 2
Reward prediction errors in cognitive ﬂexibility. Regionswhich correlate with RPEs across
all subjects (p b .05 FWE; only clusterswith k N 29 are listed). All coordinates are reported
in MNI space. RPE: increasing activity with increasing RPEs;−RPE: decreasing RPEs elicit
more activity; aIns: anterior insula; amygd: amygdala; dmPFC: dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex; dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; IPL: inferior prefrontal cortex; mPFC:medial
prefrontal cortex; PCC: posterior cingulate cortex; SFG: superior frontal gyrus; vmPFC:
ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
Contrast Region Hemisphere Cluster
size
(voxels)
x y z z score
RPE amygd Right 95 18 −7.5 −18 6.74
Left 69 −27 −9 −19.5 6.03
putamen Left 99 −27 −13.5 1.5 6.40
mPFC Left 132 −9 55.5 18 6.05
IPL Left 64 −48 −63 22.5 5.97
SFG Left 30 −18 30 45 5.93
PCC Left 133 −6 −54 12 5.91
precentral Right 50 55.5 0 6 5.89
vmPFC Left 189 −10.5 42 −10.5 5.83
−RPE dmPFC Bilateral 1712 1.5 28.5 39 7.15
aIns Right 622 36 18 −1.5 6.90
Left 326 −34.5 16.5 −6 6.52
dlPFC Right 196 25.5 48 27 6.45
163 39 31.5 33 5.82
IPL Right 112 55.5 −42 43.5 6.24
35 37.5 −42 42 5.91
Left 89 −36 −46.5 40.5 5.95
Precuneus Bilateral 65 7.5 −66 48 6.14
Fig. 3.Differences between adolescents and adults in the RPE network. (A) A network con-
taining the dmPFC (upper panel) and the aIns (lower panel) shows increased activation
for decreasing RPEs among all subjects. (B) A group comparison between the adolescents
and adults reveals a signiﬁcant activation difference in the right aIns. (C) Subsequent ex-
ploratory analysis revealed that this group difference was mainly driven by an increased
activation for negative RPEs in adolescents. ***: p b .001.
351T.U. Hauser et al. / NeuroImage 104 (2015) 347–354comparisons, Fig. 3C). Neutral (t(34) = 1.18, p = .734) and positive
RPEs (t(34)= 2.06, p= .142)were not signiﬁcantly different. This sug-
gests that the difference in the aIns wasmainly driven by themost neg-
ative RPEs, which is well in line with our behavioral ﬁnding of the
increased learning rate for negative RPEs.
Discussion
In this study, we investigated developmental aspects of cognitive
ﬂexibility using the mechanistic learning and decision making frame-
work of reinforcement learning theory. By using an advanced reinforce-
ment learning model, we found that adolescents learn more quickly
from negative RPEs than adults. This implies that adolescents adjust
their behavior more quickly after feedbacks which are worse than
they expected.
Interestingly, most previous studies which investigated cognitive
ﬂexibility found strong performance improvements during childhood,
but less behavioral differences between adolescents and adults
(e.g., Crone et al., 2004, 2008; Hämmerer et al., 2011; Welsh et al.,
1991; Wendelken et al., 2012). When looking at the behavior in our
groups without using computational models, we do not ﬁnd any differ-
ence in overall task performance or the number of switches, similar to
the ﬁndings by Hämmerer et al. (2011). The marginally signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the number of punishments before switches, however, points
to the increased learning rate that we found in our modeling approach.
This suggests that the use of reinforcement learning methods to study
cognitive ﬂexibility may bemore sensitive to differences in the learning
process than common behavioral analyses.
Previous studies on adolescent decision making under uncertainty
found that adolescents are reward driven and behave rather risk
seeking (e.g., Figner et al., 2009; Tymula et al., 2012). Therefore, our
ﬁnding that adolescents are more sensitive to negative RPEs might ap-
pear to be somewhat contradictory on the ﬁrst sight. However, we do
not think that these results are conﬂicting, because these studies that
found increased reward seeking did not investigate cognitive ﬂexibility.
Usually, tasks which were used to study reward seeking had different
reinforcement structures which did not involve sudden changes in re-
ward contingencies. Namely, these tasks often merely required to
learn the association between a stimulus and a (probabilistic) outcome(e.g., Cohen et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2012). They did not require to
detect environmental changes and to continuously adjust to changes in
the reward contingencies. Therefore, negative RPEs have decreasing im-
pact for the subjects' learning process over the course of the task: The
negative RPEs carry information about the value of stimuli (similarly
as positive RPEs), but they do not indicate changes in reward structures.
In our task, however, negative RPEs continue to be essential, given that
they carry important information about changes in reward contingen-
cies. We therefore think that the increased sensitivity which we found
in this study may reﬂect an additional aspect to differ between adoles-
cent and adult decisionmaking, apart from the reward seeking behavior
in adolescents in tasks unrelated to cognitive ﬂexibility.
In our fMRI analysis of RPEs, we replicated previous studies showing
that RPEs are positively associated with a decision making network
containing the striatum and vmPFC (e.g., Gläscher et al., 2009;
Rutledge et al., 2010; Voon et al., 2010; Table 2), in which both areas
are associated with valuation, value comparison and evaluation of
352 T.U. Hauser et al. / NeuroImage 104 (2015) 347–354objects (e.g., Gläscher et al., 2010; Hunt et al., 2013). Additionally, the
RPEs anticorrelatedwith dmPFC and the aIns (Fig. 3A, Table 2), meaning
that activity in this area increases with decreasing RPEs. These areas are
important hubs for cognitive control and affective processing and are
thought to guide behavioral adaptation (Cavanagh and Frank, 2014;
Critchley, 2005; Hampton and O'Doherty, 2007).
In the group comparison, we found a signiﬁcantly different activa-
tion in the aIns. No difference was found in the other areas of the RPE
network. The neural responses of the aIns support our behavioral ﬁnd-
ing that adolescents weremore sensitive to negative RPEs: the differen-
tial activation was mainly driven by the most negative RPEs, while
neutral or positive RPEs did not elicit signiﬁcantly different responses
per se.
The aIns is a central hub in the brain and is oneof themost commonly
activated areas in human neuroimaging studies (Nelson et al., 2010). It is
activated in a wide variety of cognitive and emotional tasks (Dosenbach
et al., 2006) and forms the important salience network in resting state
literature (Menon and Uddin, 2010). Unsurprisingly, the aIns has been
ascribed to awide variety of functions fromprocessing visceral andemo-
tional information (Critchley, 2005) to controlling attention and task de-
mands (Dosenbach et al., 2006, 2007; Nelson et al., 2010). The aIns is also
crucially involved in decisionmaking and similar tasks. It has been found
to process RPEs (Pessiglioneet al., 2006; Seymour et al., 2004; Voon et al.,
2010; Wittmann et al., 2008), it indicates (feedback) errors with a high
reliability (Dosenbach et al., 2006), and it has a high predictive value
for task switching in a similar cognitive ﬂexibility task (Hampton and
O'Doherty, 2007). This is also in line with the assumption that the aIns
is involved when a feedback is processed consciously (Nelson et al.,
2010; Wheeler et al., 2008). Moreover, the aIns has been associated
with processing information about risk (Burke and Tobler, 2011; Ishii
et al., 2012; Paulus et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2008).
Differences in aIns activity have often been found in the develop-
mental literature. Previous studies found developmental effects during
tasks of cognitive ﬂexibility (e.g., Christakou et al., 2009; Rubia et al.,
2006; Smith et al., 2011) and in other cognitive domains (Christakou
et al., 2011; Jarcho et al., 2012; Keulers et al., 2011; Masten et al.,
2009; Somerville et al., 2011; Van Leijenhorst et al., 2010). However,
the developmental importance of this area has largely been neglected.
Given the wealth of information about aIns functioning, one could
speculate about how the increased activity in adolescents might be re-
lated to their increased learning rate. It is well known that aIns activity
often coincides with activation in the dmPFC (cf. Hauser et al., 2014a,
2014b; Nelson et al., 2010; Seymour et al., 2004). However, it is as-
sumed that the dmPFC is mainly involved in processing cognitive as-
pects, whereas the aIns rather processes visceral and emotional
information (Nelson et al., 2010). The increased insular activity (esp.
to negative RPEs)might indicate that adolescents weight the emotional
information more strongly which then leads to a faster adaptation from
negative feedbacks. This idea is in line with the assumption by Van
Leijenhorst et al. (2010) who also found increased insular activity and
associated it with increased physiological arousal. Additionally, it ﬁts
well with Crone and Dahl's suggestion that adolescence is a time
when affective systems are a major driving force for goal selection and
decision making (Crone and Dahl, 2012).
Lately, Smith et al. (2014) reviewed developmental studies with re-
spect to the aIns and integrated them into a new neurodevelopmental
theory of adolescent decision making. The authors state that the aIns –
as being a cognitive-emotional hub – is immaturely connected during
adolescence and therefore adolescents are biased toward affectively
driven decisions. This notion seems to be well in line with Crone and
Dahl's idea of a dominant social-affective system (Crone and Dahl,
2012), and also ﬁts well with our ﬁndings in this study.
Very recently, Javadi et al. (2014a, b) published two papers from
their study on developmental effects in decision making. Similarly to
our study, the authors also used a probabilistic reinforcement learning
task and used computational algorithms to infer their learningmechanisms. The authors (Javadi et al., 2014a) found an increased deci-
sion noise in their adolescent sample compared to healthy adults. How-
ever, the authors did not ﬁnd any differences in prediction error
processing in their regions-of-interest - despite their large adolescent
sample. There are several crucial differences in their analysis which pos-
sibly are responsible for the diverging ﬁndings. In their behavioral
modeling, Javadi et al. (2014a) used a Rescorla–Wagner model which
does not differentiate between learning from positive and negative
RPEs (Krugel et al., 2009; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Therefore, it is
evident that the authors could not detect an increased learning rate
for negative RPEs. Interestingly, the authors report a marginally differ-
ent switching probability after correctly punished trials—similar as in
our study. Additionally, their learning model seems to only update the
chosen, but not the unchosen option.We and others previously demon-
strated that models which update both options are better suited to
model such a probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks (Gläscher
et al., 2009; Hauser et al., 2014a). Moreover, in their fMRI analysis, the
authors only analyzed responses in the anterior cingulate, ventral stria-
tum and the vmPFC (Javadi et al., 2014a, b). Similar as in our study, they
did not ﬁnd any RPE differences in these areas. Unfortunately, the au-
thors did not report any analysis of the aIns. Therefore, it cannot be de-
termined whether their aIns showed similar developmental changes in
RPE processing.
RPE-like signals are assumed to reﬂect a general neural update signal
in a variety of domains, not only in decision making (Friston, 2010;
Iglesias et al., 2013). Therefore, an increased insular sensitivity to nega-
tive RPEs might not only affect decision making, but also other areas in
which adolescence reﬂects a unique period, such as in social interactions
or psychiatric disorders. Adolescents are known to be more sensitive to
the presence of peers (Chein et al., 2011) and peer rejection (Masten
et al., 2009), and show a markedly increased prevalence in psychiatric
disorders, such as anxiety, depression or substance abuse (Kessler
et al., 2005, 2007). Although these problems are well known, it has
only recently been suggested that they might have a common neural
basis (Paus et al., 2008). The aIns seems to be crucial in all three domains.
It is strongly involved in empathy-related processes (Singer et al., 2004,
2009) and social rejection (Masten et al., 2009). It has also been associat-
ed with depression, anxiety or substance abuse (for reviews cf. Craig,
2009; Naqvi and Bechara, 2009). Based on the idea that the aIns is an in-
tegrative hub which associates cognitive and affective–visceral informa-
tion, one could speculate that overly strong (negative) prediction errors
in the insular cortex reﬂect an overly dominant affective feedback. If an
adolescent is not able to cognitively down-regulate such strong predic-
tion errors (caused by social interactions, visceral inputs or homeostatic
imbalances), she/he may use other strategies to suppress these signals.
Such alternative strategies could entail to externallymanipulate affective
inputs (e.g., by taking neuroactive substances), or to adjust internal ex-
pectations and beliefs (e.g., catastrophic thinking in anxiety (Hofmann,
2005) or learned helplessness in depression (Seligman, 1992)). Howev-
er, there is very little evidence for such mechanisms so far and further
studies are urgently needed to investigate the extent towhich activation
differences in the aIns also play a role in adolescent social interactions or
juvenile psychiatric disorders.
In this study, the age spectrum of our adolescent group had a rela-
tively large age range (12–16 years). We sampled from a large age-
width of the adolescence spectrum, becausewewanted to draw conclu-
sionswhich are generalizable for most of adolescence. If one only inves-
tigates a small age-range, it is unclearwhether thedifferences are highly
speciﬁc for only this age orwhether they have validity for thewhole pe-
riod of adolescence.With our approach, however, we are not able to de-
tect differences which may only occur early or late in adolescence.
Additionally, given the relatively small sample size, we were also not
able to look at age-related changes during adolescence. In further stud-
ies, it is essential to increase sample sizes and/or to use longitudinal de-
signs to determine whether the learning trajectories (and their neural
correlates) show changes also within the period of adolescence.
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Taken together, our ﬁndings expand the current knowledge of ado-
lescents learning and decision making. While adolescents have often
been described as reward-driven and risk-seeking (Blakemore and
Robbins, 2012; Galvan, 2010), we were able to show that in the context
of cognitive ﬂexibility, adolescents are more sensitive to negative RPEs
than adults. This novel ﬁnding suggests that decision making in adoles-
cence goes beyond merely increased reward-seeking behavior—at least
in the context of cognitive ﬂexibility. Our neuroimaging results suggest
that this difference is likely to be caused by an altered response of the
aIns. It is well established that the aIns receives dopaminergic innerva-
tions (Gaspar et al., 1989) and processes dopamine-associated RPEs.
Whether the altered response of the aIns is driven by similar changes
in the dopaminergic system as suggested for reward seeking behaviors
(Galvan, 2010; Spear, 2000; Steinberg, 2008) remains, however, unclear
and should be examined in future studies.
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